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Abstract: Extending Gali and Monacelli (2004), we build an N-country open
economy model, where each economy is subject to sticky wages and prices and,
potentially, has access to sales and income taxes as well as government spending
as ﬁscal instruments. We examine an economy either as a small open economy
under ﬂexible exchange rates or as a member of a monetary union. In a small
open economy when all three ﬁscal instruments are freely available, we show an-
alytically that the impact of technology and mark-up shocks can be completely
eliminated, whether policy acts with discretion or commitment. However, once
any one of these ﬁscal instruments is excluded as a stabilisation tool, costs can
emerge. Using simulations, we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal instrument in this case
(in the sense of reducing the welfare costs of the shock) is either income taxes
or sales taxes. In contrast, having government spending as an instrument con-
tributes very little. In the case of mark-up shocks tax instruments which can
oﬀset the impact of the shock directly are highly eﬀective, while other ﬁscal
instruments are less useful.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union does not respond)
are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely available, the
technology shock will incur welfare costs. Government spending is potentially
useful as a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for
monetary policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes at
reducing the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. If all three
taxes are available, they can reduce the impact of the technology shock on the
union member by around a half, compared to the case where ﬁscal policy is not
used.
Finally we consider the robustness of these results to two extensions. Firstly,
introducing government debt, such that policy makers take account of the debt
consequences of using ﬁscal instruments as stabilisation devices, and, secondly,
introducing implementation lags in the use of ﬁscal instruments. We ﬁnd that
the need for debt sustainability has very limited impact on the use of ﬁscal
instruments for stabilisation purposes, while implementation lags can reduce,
but not eliminate, the gains from ﬁscal stabilisation.
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1O v e r v i e w
There has been a wealth of recent work deriving optimal monetary policy for
both closed and open economies utilising New Classical Keynesian Synthesis
models where the structural model of the economy and the description of policy
makers’ objectives are consistently microfounded (see for example, Woodford
(2003) for a comprehensive treatment of the closed economy case, and Clarida
et al (2001) for its extension to the open economy case.). More recently, a
number of papers have extended this analysis to include various forms of active
ﬁscal policy, although only a few in the context of open economies or a monetary
union.1
Even when ﬁscal policy has been analysed, however, the number of active
ﬁscal instruments considered has tended to be small (often one, sometimes two),
and these instruments are assumed to be as ﬂexible as interest rates. In this
paper we consider open economies in which there are three potential ﬁscal in-
struments alongside monetary policy: government spending, income taxes and
sales taxes. Unlike most papers in the literature, we allow for inertia in both
price and wage setting. This is important, because with wage inertia it is no
longer possible for monetary policy to replicate the eﬃcient ﬂexible price equi-
librium in the face of technology shocks. As we shall show, this introduces an
important potential role for using tax as a stabilisation instrument.
As well as the small open economy case, we also consider the case of an
individual member of a monetary union, using a framework set out in Gali
and Monacelli (2004) (henceforth GM). We examine optimal policies when all
ﬁscal instruments are available and fully ﬂexible, and then look at the impact
on welfare if there are lags in using these instruments, or if only a subset of
instruments are available for short term stabilisation.
Our benchmark regime is for a small open economy, when all three ﬁscal
instruments are freely available. Here we can show analytically that the welfare
impact of technology shocks (in the sense that the shock will result in vari-
ables deviating from their eﬃcient levels due to price and wage stickiness) can
be completely eliminated, whether policy acts with discretion or commitment.
1For example, Sutherland (2004) and Beetsma and Jensen (2004).
2However, once any one of these ﬁscal instruments is excluded as a stabilisation
tool, costs emerge. Using simulations, we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal instrument
in this case (in the sense of reducing the welfare costs of the shock) is either
income taxes or sales taxes. In constrast, having government spending as an in-
strument contributes very little. This is also true of mark-up shocks where only
a tax instrument which can directly oﬀset the inﬂationary pressures created by
the shock is eﬀective in dealing with the shock.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union does not respond)
are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely available, the
technology shock will incur welfare costs. Government spending is potentially
useful as a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for
monetary policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes at
reducing the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. Again, ﬁscal
i n s t r u m e n t sh a v et ob et a i l o r e dt ot h es p e c i ﬁcm a r k - u ps h o c kt ob ee ﬀective.
Initially, our analysis assumes the existence of a lump sum tax whose sole
purpose is to balance the budget each period. As Ricardian Equivalence holds,
changes in this tax have no impact on the economy, but allow us to ignore the
government’s budget constraint in our analysis. Results presented elsewhere
(Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005)) suggests abandoning this device would have
little impact on our results. This is because it is optimal either to accommodate
the impact of ﬁscal shocks on debt (i.e. debt has a random walk character, as
in Benigno and Woodford (2005)), or that the optimal speed for correcting debt
disequilibrium is slow. In this paper we conﬁrm this, by considering the case
where lump-sum taxes are not available to oﬀset the ﬁscal consequences of using
ﬁscal instruments as stabilisation devices.
We also assess the robustness of our results to signiﬁcant implementation
lags inherent in changing ﬁscal instruments over the course of a business cy-
cle. Implementation lags associated with particular instruments are likely to
vary from country to country, so we consider a range of possibilities. We ﬁnd
that while these lags can reduce the welfare beneﬁts of using ﬁscal policy as a
stabilisation device, it does not eliminate these beneﬁts.
Our next section derives the model. Section 3 outlines the social planner’s
problem such that we can write our model in ‘gap’ form. This representation of
t h em o d e lc a na l s ob eu s e dt od e r i v eaq u a d r a t i ca p p r o x i m a t i o nt ow e l f a r e .I n
section 4 we derive the optimal pre-commitment policies for the open economy
and for a continuum of economies participating in monetary union. Section
5 simulates such economies to quantify the relative contribution of alternative
ﬁscal instruments to macroeconomic stability. In this section we also consider
the importance of implementation lags in relation to ﬁscal variables. Section
6 adds government debt to the model and assesses the importance of the con-
straints imposed by the need for ﬁscal solvency. A conclusion summarises the
main results.
32 The Model
This section outlines our model. As noted above this is similar in structure
to GM, but we allow for the existence of sticky wages as well as prices and
introduce distortionary sales and income taxes. The model is further extended
by introducing government debt in section 6.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one, who diﬀer in that they pro-
vide diﬀerentiated labour services to ﬁrms in their economy. However, we shall
assume full asset markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the
same budget constraint and make the same consumption plans even if they face
diﬀerent wage rates due to stickiness in wage-setting. As a result the typical






where C,G and N are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and
labour supply respectively. Here the only notation referring to the speciﬁc
household, k, indexes the labour input, as full ﬁnancial markets will imply that
all other variables are constant across households.






(1 − α)(1−α)αα (2)
where, if we drop the time subscript, all variables are commensurate. CH is a






























which implies that public goods are all domestically produced. The elasticity of
substitution between varieties ²>1 is common across countries. The parameter
α is (inversely) related to the degree of home bias in preferences, and is a natural
measure of openness.









= Πt + Dt + WtN(k)t(1 − τt) − Tt
where Pi,t(j) is the price of variety j imported from country i expressed in
home currency, Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end of
period t, Π is the representative household’s share of proﬁts in the imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms, W are wages, τ is an wage income tax rate, and T are lump
sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoﬀs.
Households must ﬁrst decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimises the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure

























PH(j)CH(j)dj = PHCH (11)
Z 1
0
Pi(j)Ci(j)dj = PiCi (12)














This implies Z 1
0
PiCidi = PFCF (15)
5Optimisation between imported and domestically produced goods implies
PHCH =( 1 − α)PC (16)






is the consumer price index (CPI). The budget constraint can therefore be
rewritten as
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt + Dt + WtN(k)t(1 − τt) − Tt (19)
2.1.1 Households’ Intertemporal Consumption Problem
The ﬁrst of the household’s intertemporal problems involves allocating consump-
tion expenditure across time. For tractability assume (following GM) that (1)









In addition, assume that the elasticity of substitution between the baskets of
foreign goods produced in diﬀerent countries is η =1(this is equivalent to
adopting logarithmic utility in the aggregation of such baskets).
We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (19) to obtain
















where Rt = 1
Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
oﬀ a unit of domestic currency in t+1 . This is the familiar consumption Euler
equation which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption
over time such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods
(after allowing for tilting due to interest rates diﬀering from the households’
rate of time preference).
A log-linearised version of (22) can be written as
ct = Et{ct+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) (23)
where lowercase denotes logs (with an important exception for g noted below),
ρ = 1
β − 1,a n dπt = pt − pt−1 is consumer price inﬂation.
62.1.2 Households’ Wage-Setting Behaviour
We now need to consider the wage-setting behaviour of households. We assume
that ﬁrms need to employ a CES aggregate of the labour of all households in
the domestic production of consumer goods. This is provided by an ‘aggregator’










where N(k) is the labour provided by household k to the aggregator. Again we
allow the degree of labour diﬀerentiation to vary in response to iid shocks which
introduce the possibility of wage mark-up shocks. Accordingly the demand







where N is the CES aggregate of labour services in the economy which also





where N(j) is the labour employed by ﬁrm j. The price of this labour is given























where Λt+s = C
−1





N is the demand curve for the household’s labour. The ﬁrst-order

































































where µw = ²w


























where W denotes the wage chosen by all households that were able to renegotiate








which is the conventional labour supply decision (after allowing for the fact
that households have market power in setting wages). The wage index evolves










where Wt is the optimal nominal wage set by those households that were able
to do so in period t according to equation (32). These can be combined into a
form of New Keynesian Phillips curve for wage inﬂation, as shown in Appendix










θw . Note that the forcing variable in the NKPC is a
log-linearsed measure of the extent to which wages are not at the level implied
by the labour supply decision that would hold under ﬂexible wages.
2.2 Price and Exchange Rate Identities














(pi − pH)di (38)
2In order to allow a role for mark-up shocks in wage-setting we shall later subject this
mark-up to iid shocks.





Using the deﬁnition of the eﬀective terms of trade this can be rewritten as,
P = PHSα (40)
or in logs as
p = pH + αs (41)
where s = pF − pH is the logged terms of trade. By taking ﬁrst-diﬀerences it
follows that,
πt = πH,t + α(st − st−1) (42)
There is assumed to be free-trade in goods, such that the law of one price
holds for individual goods at all times. This implies,
Pi(j)=εiPi
i(j) (43)
where εi is the bilateral nominal exchange rate and Pi
i(j) is the price of county





































= e + p∗ (48)
where e =
R 1
0 eidi is the log of the nominal eﬀective exchange rate, pi
i is the
logged domestic price index for country i, and p∗ =
R 1
0 pi
idi is the log of the
world price index. For the world as a whole there is no distinction between
consumer prices and the domestic (world) price level.
Combining the deﬁnition of the terms of trade and the result just obtained
gives
s = pF − pH (49)
= e + p∗ − pH (50)
9Now consider the link between the terms of trade and the real exchange
rate. (Note that although we have free trade and the law of one price holds for
individual goods, our economies do not exhibit PPP since there is a home bias
in the consumption of home and foreign goods. PPP only holds if we eliminate
this home bias and assume α =1since this implies that the share of home goods
in consumption is the same as any other country’s i.e. inﬁnitesimally small.)





where Pi and P are the two countries respective CPI price levels. In logged




(ei + pi − p)di (52)
= e + p∗ − p (53)
= s + pH − p (54)
=( 1 − α)s (55)
2.3 International risk sharing
Assume symmetric initial conditions (e.g. zero net foreign assets etc) and recall












Since ﬁnancial markets are complete, a similar condition must exist in the foreign









































where εi is the nominal exchange rate between home and country i.U s i n gt h e
































10In other words risk sharing implies that the relationship between consumption
at home and country i is given by the following expression,
Ct = ziCi
tQi,t (61)
where zi is a constant which depends upon initial conditions. Loglinearising
and integrating over all countries yields,
c = c∗ + q (62)
where c∗ =
R 1
0 cidi,or using the relationship between the terms of trade and the
real exchange rate,
c = c∗ +( 1− α)s (63)
2.4 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising
total costs,
R 1







The production function is linear, so for ﬁrm j
Y (j)=AN(j) (65)














)di + G] (66)




























where κ is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-
state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary sales
and income taxes (assuming there is a lump-sum tax available to ﬁnance such a








































Solving for the optimal reset price, which is common across all ﬁrms able to
































Appendix 2 then details the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
for domestic price inﬂation which is given by,
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + λ(mct +l n ( µt)) (73)
whereλ =
(1−θpβ)(1−θp)
θp and mc = −a + w − pH − ln(1 − τs) − v are the real
log-linearised marginal costs of production, and v = −ln(1−κ). In the absence
of sticky prices proﬁt maximising behaviour implies, mc = −ln(µ) where µ is
the steady-state mark-up.
2.6 Equilibrium



























)di + G] (76)









12allows us to write









)di + G (78)




= CSα + G (80)
Taking logs implies
ln(Y − G)=c + αs (81)




= y − g (83)
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne g = −ln(1 − G
Y ). As this condition holds for all countries, we




(ci + gi + αsi)di (84)
However
R 1




(ci + gi)di = c∗ + g∗ (85)
We can use these relationships to rewrite (23) as
yt = Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} − αEt{st+1 − st}
= Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} (86)






(ϕnt − wt + ct + pt − ln(1 − τt)+l n ( µw
t )) (87)
Here the forcing variable captures the extent to which the consumer’s labour
supply decision is not the same as it would be under ﬂexible wages. Deﬁne this
variable as mcw = ϕnt − wt + ct + pt − ln(1 − τt). This can be manipulated as
follows,
mcw = ϕn − w + pH + c + p − pH − ln(1 − τ) (88)
= ϕn − w + pH + c + αs − ln(1 − τ) (89)
= ϕy − (w − pH)+c∗ + s − ln(1 − τ) − ϕa (90)
From above we had
y = c∗ + g + s (91)
13so we can also write marginal costs appropriate to wage inﬂation as
mcw =( 1+ϕ)y − (w − pH) − ln(1 − τ) − g − ϕa (92)
Real wages evolve according to,
wt − pH,t = πw
H,t − πH,t + wt−1 − pH,t−1 (93)
2.7 Summary of Model
We are now in a position to summarise our model. On the demand side we have
an Euler equation for consumption,
yt = Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} (94)
On the supply side there are equations for price inﬂation,
πH,t = βEt{πH,t+1} + λ(mct +l n ( µt)) (95)
where λ =[ ( 1− βθ)(1 − θ)]/θ and mc = −a + w − pH − ln(1 − τs) − v.T h e r e









which together determine the evolution of real wages,
wt − pH,t = πw
H,t − πH,t + wt−1 − pH,t−1 (97)
The model is then closed by the policy maker specifying the appropriate values
of the ﬁscal and monetary policy variables. However, although this represents
a fully speciﬁed model it is often recast in the form of ‘gap’ variables which are
more consistent with utility-based measures of welfare.
2.8 Gap variables
Deﬁne the natural level of (log) output yn as the level that would occur in the
absence of nominal inertia and conditional on the optimal choice of government
spending, the steady-state tax rates and the actual level of world output. Deﬁne
the output gap as
yg = y − yn (98)
With ﬂexible prices and wages we have mcn = −µ and mcw,n = −µw(see
above). Substituting into the expressions for mc and mcw implies,
−ln(µ)=−a + wn − pn
H − ln(1 − τs) − v (99)
where the consumption tax rate has been ‘barred’ to denote its steady-state
value. Solving for equilibrium real wages,
wn − pn
H = −ln(µ)+a +l n ( 1− τs)+v (100)
14Similarly for the ‘marginal costs’ determining wage inﬂation,
−ln(µw)=( 1 + ϕ)yn − (wn − pn
H) − ln(1 − τ) − gn + ϕa (101)
−ln(µw)=( l n ( µ)) − ln(1 − τs) − v +( 1+ϕ)(yn − a) − ln(1 − τ) − gn
yn = a + gn/(1 + ϕ)+( v +l n ( 1− τ) − ln(µ) − ln(µw))/(1 + ϕ)
We can rearrange this as
−(v +l n ( 1− τ) − ln(µ) − ln(µw)) = a(1 + ϕ)+gn − yn(1 + ϕ) (102)
W ec a nt h e nw r i t e
mcw,g = mcw +l n ( µw
t ) (103)
=( 1 + ϕ)y − (w − pH) − ln(1 − τ) − g − ϕa +l n ( µw
t ) (104)
=( 1 + ϕ)yg − gg − (wg − p
g
H) − ln(1 − τ)g (105)
where ln(1−τ)g =l n ( 1−τ)−ln(1−τ). Substituting this into the Phillips curve











t =l n ( µw
t /µw) is the wage mark-up shock. A similar expression for
price inﬂation is given by,










t =l n ( µ
p











H,t−1 − ∆at (108)









t = ρ + Et{yn
t+1 − yn
t } − Et{gn
t+1 − gn
t } (110)
This allows us to write (86) for gap variables as
y
g
t = yt − yn
t = Et{y
g
t+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − rn





Note that, given (101), the real natural rate of interest depends - like natural
output - only on the productivity shock, the steady-state levels of distortionary
taxation and the optimal level of government spending.
153 Optimal policy
3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem in a Small Open Econ-
omy.
The social planner simply decides how to allocate consumption and production
of goods within the economy, subject to the various constraints implied by oper-
ating as part of a larger group of economies e.g. IRS. Since they are concerned
with real allocations, the social planner ignores nominal inertia in describing
optimal policy .
The social planner will produce equal quantities of all goods, so we can write
Y = AN (112)
Combining aggregate demand and international risk sharing implies
ln(C)=l n ( C∗)+( 1− α)ln(S)=l n ( C∗)+( 1− α)(ln(Y − G) − ln(C∗)) (113)
= αln(C∗)+( 1− α)ln(Y − G) (114)
























1 − α + χ
(119)
which implies the optimal value for g,




3.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Proﬁt-maximising behaviour implies that ﬁrms will operate at the point at which
marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
mcw,n = −ln(µw) (121)
= −ln(1 − τ)+a +( 1+ϕ)nn − gn − (wn − pn
H)
16= −ln(µ)+l n ( 1− κ) − ln(1 − τ) − ln(1 − τs)























1 − α + χ
(124)
and if the subsidy κ is given by






)(1 − τs)(1 − τ)/(1 − α) (125)
then
Nn =( 1− α + χ)
1
1+ϕ (126)
is identical to the optimal level of employment above. Here the subsidy has
to overcome the distortions due to monopoly pricing in the goods and labour
markets, as well as the distortionary income and sales taxes.
3.3 The Social Planner’s Problem in a Monetary Union
Here the social planner maximises utility across all countries subject to
Y i = AiNi (127)






i dj + Gi (128)


























dj = Ai χi
Gi (131)
This implies



















17The latter implies g =l n ( 1+χi) which is a diﬀerent ﬁscal rule than in the case
of the small open economy. Why? In the small open economy case governments
have an incentive to increase government spending (which is devoted solely to
domestically produced goods) to induce an appreciation in the terms of trade. In
aggregate this cannot happen, but it leaves government spending ineﬃciently
high. The government spending rule under monetary union eliminates this
externality. This also has implications for the derivation of union and national
welfare which are discussed below.
3.4 Social Welfare
Appendix 3 derives the quadratic approximation to utility across member states































It contains quadratic terms in price and wage inﬂation reﬂecting the costs of
price and wage dispersion induced by inﬂation in the presence of nominal inertia,
as well as terms in the output gap and government spending gap. The weights
attached to each element are a function of deep model parameters. The key
to obtaining this quadratic speciﬁcation is in adopting an employment subsidy
which eliminates the distortions caused by imperfect competition in labour and
product markets as well as the impact of distortionary sales and income taxes.
It is also important to note that it is assumed that national ﬁscal authorities
have internalised the externality caused by their desire to appreciate the terms
of trade through excessive government expenditure.
In deriving national welfare for an economy outside of monetary union this
externality is not corrected. It can be shown that the objective function be-
comes,
Ψi = −



























which is in the same form as the union-wide welfare function. However it diﬀers
in the ﬁrst term multiplying the objective function and in the deﬁnition of the
eﬃcient steady-state around which the ‘gapped’ variables are deﬁned, which
reﬂects the externality which is accepted as a fact of life outside of EMU, but
which is eliminated within EMU.
184 Precommitment Policy
In this section we shall consider precommitment policies for the various variants
of our model.
4 . 1 P r e c o m m i t m e n ti nt h eS m a l lO p e nE c o n o m y
We shall initially consider policy in an economy not participating in monetary
union. Aside from a direct interest in assessing the potential role for stabilising
ﬁscal policy within a small open economy under ﬂexible exchange rates, this
is also informative as union-wide monetary policy will be of the same form as
national monetary policy in the open economy. In the small open economy case,
our ‘gapped’ model of country i consists of the following equations. Firstly, the




















i,t and e λw = λw
(1+ϕ²w)and have
added uw
t - an iid shock to the steady-state mark-up in wage setting. The similar
expression for price inﬂation is given by,




i,t) − ln(1 − τ
i,s





t is an iid shock to the steady-state mark-up of the imperfectly compet-










































and its instruments are interest rates, government spending and the two tax




































t (πi,t − βEt{πi,t+1} − λ[rwi,g − ln(1 − τ
i,s


























19where dated λ with superscripts denote lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order




When there is a national monetary policy it is as if the monetary authorities
have control over consumption such that the consumption Euler equation ceases




i.e. the price Phillips curve ceases to be a constraint on maximising welfare
- sales tax changes can oﬀset the impact on any other variables driving price




The remaining focs are for real wages,
−λλ
π,i














































and the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g








Combinations of these ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the target criteria for a
variety of cases, such that alternative ﬁscal regimes are modelled by retaining
or dropping the focs associated with a speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument. In deriving
precommiment policy we consider the general solution to the system of focs
after the initial time period, which gives us a set of target criteria which policy
must achieve. In the initial period we have two ways of solving the system
of focs. We can derive a set of initial values for lagrange multipliers dated at
time t=-1, such that the target criteria are also followed in the initial period -
this constitutes what is known as the policy from a ‘timeless perspective’ (see
Woodford 2003). Alternatively we can allow policy makers to exploit the fact
that expectations are ﬁxed in the initial period and utilise the discretionary
solution for the initial period only. This amounts to setting the time t=-1 dated
lagrange multipliers to zero (see Currie and Levine (1993)). Although we adopt
the latter approach in simulations, we do not report the focs associated with
the initial period in order to conserve space since these do not provide any
additional economic intuition.
204.1.1 Small Open Economy - All Fiscal Instruments
Let us consider the case where the ﬁscal authorities have access to government
spending and both tax instruments in order to stabilise their economy, when
operating alongside the national monetary authorities. Appendix 5 details the













In other words the eﬀects of shocks on these gap variables are completely oﬀset
and do not have any welfare implications. Since these target criteria are all
static, it will also be the case that the optimal discretionary policy will be the
same as this precommitment policy. In terms of policy assignments, monetary
policy ensures the output gap is zero. Wage inﬂation is eliminated by the















This shows that with appropriate ﬁscal instruments available for stabilisation
purposes cost push-shocks become trivial to deal with, in contrast to the stan-
dard case where they are the shocks that imply the monetary authorities face a
trade-oﬀ in stabilising output and inﬂation (see, Clarida et al (1999) for exam-
ple).
4.1.2 Small Open Economy - VAT and Government Spending
Now suppose we only have access to the sales tax and government spending as
























21This is similar to the form of target criteria that emerges when only prices are
sticky and the only policy instrument is interest rates. Essentially the presence
of the sales tax instrument simpliﬁes the target criteria that emerges when both
prices and wages are sticky, in the sense that the order of the dynamics of this
target criterion are lower than the would otherwise be (see Woodford (2003),
Chapter 7, and Section 4.1.4 below). The sales tax rule that simpliﬁes the
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t =0 (159)
4.1.3 Small Open Economy - Income Tax and Government Spending
Now suppose we have the income tax instrument and government spending, but
sales taxes are ﬁxed. Appendix 5 shows that our policy assignment contains the









which is our ﬁrst target criterion.
The optimal mix of inﬂation and output to be achieved through the monetary




























4.1.4 Small Open Economy - No Tax Instruments, Only Government
Spending
With only a single instrument the target criteria under commitment becomes
more complex, generating a target criterion for monetary policy with a mixture













































This describes pre-commitment policy for all cases in the small open economy.
224.2 Optimal Precommitment Under EMU:
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The key diﬀerence between this and the previous problem is that we now have
a national union-wide interest rate and welfare is integrated across all member
states. As a result, we no longer have an foc for the national interest rate, but





t di =0 (165)
However, since all economies in our model are symmetrical in structure, we
can aggregate focs across our economies which delivers, in terms of union-wide
aggregates, an identical set of focs as we ﬁnd in the small open economy case
above. Therefore, the target criterion for the ECB will take the same form as
that attributed to the national monetary authority, but re-speciﬁed in terms of
union-wide aggregates.





i.e. the price Phillips curve ceases to be a constraint on maximising welfare
-VAT tax changes can oﬀset the impact on any other variables driving price




implying that income taxes can control wage inﬂation, and for real wages,
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and the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g








Combinations of these ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the national target criteria
for a variety of cases. Alternative ﬁscal regimes are modelled by retaining or
dropping the focs associated with a speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument. The details of
these manipulations are in Appendix 6.
4.2.1 EMU Case - All Fiscal Instruments
With all ﬁscal instruments, but the loss of the monetary policy instrument
we can no-longer eliminate the welfare eﬀects of shocks. Therefore our policy
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t =0 (174)
which replicates the labour supply decision that would emerge under ﬂexible
wages and thereby eliminates wage inﬂation, and a sales tax rule,
(1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t + ²(ln(1 − τ
i,s





which achieves the appropriate balance between output and inﬂation while
recognising that competitiveness will need to be restored once any shock has
passed. Again mark-up shocks are trivially dealt with by the appropriate tax
instrument.
With these ﬁscal rules in place in each member state, the ECB will act to





t di = y
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t =0 (176)
which will imply that the average government spending gap and rates of price
and wage inﬂation will all be zero in the union.
4.2.2 EMU Case - VAT and Government Spending
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With only two instruments and four constraints, the precommitment policy im-
plies a degree of both inertial and forward-looking behaviour typical of analysis
of monetary policy in such settings (see Woodford (2003), Chapter 7 ). With
these national ﬁscal rules in place, the ECB’s monetary policy will seek to














4.2.3 EMU Case - Income Tax and Government Spending
Now suppose that income taxes are the only tax instrument. We have a rule for
this instrument of the form,
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Assuming the national ﬁscal authorities implement these rules, then the ECB
will seek to achieve the following balance between output and inﬂation across













4.2.4 EMU Case - Government Spending the Only Instrument
Appendix 6 details the solution in this case, which is too complex to aﬀord any
real intuition. Numerical analysis of this and the other cases is considered in
the next section, together with a comparison with policy under discretion.
255 Optimal Policy Simulations
In this section we examine the optimal policy response to a technology shock
both within and outside monetary union. We consider discretionary and com-
mitment policies and compute the welfare beneﬁts of employing our various ﬁscal
instruments as stabilisation devices. In this section we outline the response of
the model to a series of shocks. Following GM we adopt the following parameter
set, ϕ =1 , µ =1 .2, ² =6 , θp =0 .75, β =0 .99, α =0 .4, and γ =0 .25.T h er a t i o
of government spending to gdp of 0.25 implies that χ =
γ
1−γ =1 /3 in the EMU
case3. Additionally, since we have sticky wages we need to adopt a measure
of the steady-state mark-up in the labour market. Following evidence in Leith
and Malley (2005), we choose µw =1 .2 (which implies ²w =6 ) ,a n dad e g r e eo f
wage stickiness given by θw =0 .75, which means that wage contracts last for,
on average, one year. The productivity shock follows the following pattern,
at = ρaat−1 + ξt (183)
where we adopt a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of ρa =0 .6,
although we consider the implications of alternative degrees of persistence below.
5.1 Small Open Economy Simulations
We begin by considering the response of a small open economy to a 1% tech-
nology shock with the degree of persistence described above, when no use is
made of ﬁscal policy for stabilisation purposes i.e. only monetary policy is used
to stabilise the economy in the face of shocks. Figure 1 details the responses
of key endogenous variables to the technology shock, under both commitment
and discretion4. It is important to note that, in the absence of sticky wages,
monetary policy could completely oﬀset the welfare consequences of this shock
by reducing interest rates in line with the increase in productivity. This would
ensure that domestic and foreign demand rises for the additional products and
that the full eﬀects of the productivity gain are captured in real wages. How-
ever, when nominal wages are also sticky it is not possible for monetary policy
alone to oﬀset the eﬀects of the shock. As a result of the wage stickiness, real
wages are slow to rise following the positive productivity shock and, as a result,
marginal costs fall initially and this means that the initial jump in inﬂation
is negative. This leads to a cut in nominal interest rates (greater than that
implied by the productivity shock’s aﬀect on the natural interest rate) and a
jump depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, although interest rates will be
relatively lower after this initial jump as rising marginal costs increase inﬂation.
3In the small open economy case, γ =
χ
1−α+χ such that ﬁxing the share of government
spending requires a rescaling of χ to take account of the incentive to excessive government
spending which is assumed to be eliminated within the union. In the simulations, to facilitate
comparisons, we ﬁx χ at the value described above in both the open economy and EMU cases.
4The numerical solution of optimal policy under commitment and discretion is based on
Soderlind (2003).
26The terms of trade depreciate initially, but this is far more modest than in the
ﬂexible wage case. As a result consumption rises in the home country relative
to abroad, but not by as much as output since the depreciation of the terms
of trade makes domestic goods attractive to foreign consumers. Implicitly IRS
and the positive productivity shock imply that resources are being sent abroad
to support foreign consumption, although this is not as pronounced as in the
ﬂexible wage case.
We know from our derivation of optimal policy above that when we utilise
all ﬁscal instruments we can completely oﬀset the impact of this shock on all
welfare-relevant gap variables, implying that there is no welfare cost to the
shock. Essentially, the monetary instrument eliminates the impact on the output
gap of the shock by cutting interest rates. This creates demand for domestically
produced goods by encouraging domestic consumption, which has a bias towards
domestically produced goods, and depreciating the exchange rate leading to
an increase in foreign demand. Income taxes are reduced to eliminate wage
inﬂation, but simultaneously achieve the required increase in the post tax real
wage. The sales tax is increased to eliminate the deﬂation that would otherwise
emerge as a result of the reduction in marginal costs (due to falling income taxes
and rising productivity). There is no need to adjust government spending when
the government has access to the tax instruments without constraint.
We can also consider a number of intermediate cases where not all ﬁscal
instruments are employed. The welfare beneﬁts of various combinations of ﬁscal
instrument are given in Table 15. These suggest that the greatest gains to
stabilisation in the open economy case come from the tax instruments, with
only relatively minor beneﬁts from varying government spending. Either tax
instrument is highly eﬀective in reducing the welfare costs of the technology
shock.
Table 1 - Costs of Technology Shock in Small Open Economy with Alternative
Fiscal Instruments.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.5793 0.0673 0.0863 0
No Govt Spending 0.5804 0.0708 0.0915 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.5824 0.1051 0.1356 0
No Govt Spending 0.5835 0.1082 0.1412 0
The second kind of shock we consider are one-period iid mark-up shocks
for price and wage-setting respectively. The impact of a 1% increase in the
steady-state mark-up for one period is given by,
5The ﬁg u r e si nT a b l e s1 - 3c a p t u r et h ec o s t so fd e v i a t i n gf r o mt h ee ﬃcient level of variables
due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of the particular shock, expressed as a percentage
of one-period’s steady-state consumption.
27Table 2 - Costs of Price Mark-Up Shock in Small Open Economy with Al-
ternative Fiscal Instruments.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.1539 0.1519 0 0
No Govt Spending 0.1541 0.1519 0 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.1588 0.1532 0 0
No Govt Spending 0.1573 0.1532 0 0
Table 3 - Costs of Wage Mark-Up Shock in Small Open Economy with Al-
ternative Fiscal Instruments.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.0222 0 0.0218 0
No Govt Spending 0.0228 0 0.0224 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.0283 0 0.0266 0
No Govt Spending 0.0286 0 0.0270 0
Here a sales tax can perfectly oﬀset the mark-up shock in price-setting, while
the income tax can do the same for wage mark-up shocks, but each tax is rela-
tively ineﬀective at dealing with the other shock. As was the case for technology
shocks, government spending adds little to stabilisation in the open economy
under ﬂexible exchange rates. There is a slight curiosity in the results in that
when the available instruments are government spending and the monetary pol-
icy instrument, then in the face of a wage mark-up shock it would be better
not to have access to the government spending when policy is discretionary.
Essentially, not having access to the government spending instrument in this
case, amounts to a form of commitment. However, the size of this eﬀect is very
small.
5.2 EMU Simulations
We now consider the response to an idiosyncratic technology shock for a country
operating under EMU (see Figure 2). We begin by considering the case where
there is no ﬁscal response to the shock. In this case the equilibrating mechanism
is the need to restore competitiveness following the shock. Relative to the small
open economy case, there is now no monetary policy response to either the
local productivity shock or its inﬂationary repercussions. As a result there is
no attempt to boost consumption and output with a fall in interest rates in
response to the shock (in an attempt to replicate the ﬂex price outcome). There
is an initial fall in real wages and inﬂation which induces a depreciation in the
terms of trade, although this is far smaller than in the open economy case above.
This shifts demand towards domestic goods such that prices and wages rise until
28the competitiveness gain has been reversed. In the presence of nominal inertia
and with no monetary policy/exchange rate instrument, it is diﬃcult to induce
the necessary movements in the terms of trade/real exchange rate to create a
market for the extra goods that can be produced as a result of the productivity
shock. This failure is reﬂected in the large negative output gap and real wage
gap.
We then contrast this to the case where country i employs all the ﬁscal
instruments at its disposal. We ﬁnd that optimal policy attempts to reduce the
impact of the technology shock on competitiveness. Therefore, following the
technology shock, sales and income taxes are increased. The latter completely
oﬀsets the impact of the shock on wage inﬂation, while the latter allows for only
a very limited reduction in prices following the productivity shock. As a result
of this attempt to avoid price adjustment, there is a substantial negative output
gap, although this is partially oﬀset by a rise in government spending. This
has the advantage of creating a market for the additional goods, which given
complete home bias in government spending, boosts real wages and moderates
the fall in inﬂation. There is now a smaller depreciation of the terms of trade
due to the changes in taxation and since there is less need to encourage foreign
consumption of the increased domestic production of goods due to the home
bias in government consumption. As we note below, the welfare gain from ﬁscal
stabilisation to this degree is an approximate halving of the costs of a technology
shock when part of a monetary union.
We again consider a number of intermediate cases where not all ﬁscal in-
struments are employed. The welfare beneﬁts of various combinations of ﬁscal
instrument are given in Table 4. This suggests that the greatest gains to stabil-
isation, when part of monetary union, come from utilising government spending
as a stabilisation instrument. This is due to the assumed home-bias in gov-
ernment spending which allows policy makers to purchase the additional goods
produced as a result of the productivity shock without requiring any compet-
itiveness changes which subsequently have to be undone once the shock has
passed. It is also interesting to note that even with all ﬁscal instruments in
place the costs of the shock under EMU are still greater than in the small open
economy case with just monetary policy as the only available policy instrument.
Table 4- Costs of Technology Shock Under EMU with Alternative Fiscal Instru-
ments6.
Commitment Policy No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Govt Spending 1.6707 1.6050 1.2089 1.1486
No Govt Spending 2.3121 2.1495 1.9988 1.8487
Discretionary Policy No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Govt Spending 1.6755 1.6115 1.2131 1.1486
No Govt Spending 2.3121 2.1537 2.0073 1.8487
6The ﬁg u r e si nT a b l e s4 - 6c a p t u r et h ec o s t so fd e v i a t i n gf r o mt h ee ﬃcient level of variables
due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of the particular shock, expressed as a percentage
of one-period’s steady-state consumption.
29We also examine the impact of mark-up shocks within EMU in the following
two tables.
Table 5 - Costs of Price Mark-Up Shock in EMU with Alternative Fiscal
Instruments.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.2241 0.2241 0 0
No Govt Spending 0.2242 0.2287 0 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.2241 0.2257 0 0
No Govt Spending 0.2242 0.2327 0 0
Table 6 - Costs of Wage Mark-Up Shock under EMU with Alternative Fiscal
Instruments.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.0395 0 0.0394 0
No Govt Spending 0.0403 0 0.0403 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.0405 0 0.0411 0
No Govt Spending 0.0403 0 0.0419 0
The tax instruments are highly eﬀective in dealing with the relevant cost
push shock, but are less eﬀective in oﬀsetting any mark-up shock in an area
where they do not aﬀect the ‘cost’ variable. Unlike the case with technology
shocks under EMU, government spending has little impact in oﬀsetting the im-
pact of mark-up shocks. Again, when considering wage mark-up shocks, it would
be better to only utilise the monetary policy instrument rather than in combi-
nation with government spending when policy is conducted under discretion -
h o w e v e rt h i si sav e r ys m a l le ﬀect.
Finally, in order to assess the importance of ﬁscal policy in such a stochastic
environment we subject our economies to stochastic shocks taken from Smets
and Wouters (2005). They obtain estimates for the stochastic properties of a
series of shock processes hitting the Euro area and the US. In our simulations we
assume that an individual economy within EMU is struck by idiosyncratic shocks
with similar stochastic properties. We focus on three shocks: namely price and
wage mark-up shocks which are taken to be iid shocks, and an autocorrelated
productivity shock. To convert this to consumption equivalent units we follow
Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2004) and calculate the expected welfare loss of
the shocks under alternative policy regimes. Our quadratic loss function for an

















s is a vector of variables deﬁned in the Appendix and Q is a matrix
reﬂecting the weights derived for the quadratic loss function above. After im-
plementing the optimal policy, the system will follow an AR(1) process7,




































where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix for the shocks. Kirsanova and Wren-
Lewis (2004) show that this vector can be solved for,




and inserted above to give the ex ante utility loss due to sticky prices and wages
given the size of shocks that are expected to hit the economy. Since utility is
logarithmic in consumption UCC =1 , the second order approximation to utility
is already in consumption equivalent units. It should be noted that this measure
of welfare only captures the costs of deviating from the eﬃcient level of output
due to price and wage stickiness. These costs can be converted into average
steady-state consumption equivalents by multiplying by 1−β.U s i n gt h eS m e t s
and Wouters (2005) shock processes we obtain the following numbers, detailed
in Table 8.
Table 7 - Beneﬁts of Fiscal Stabilisation8
Beneﬁts of Fiscal Stabilisation No Fiscal Response Full Fiscal Response
Small Open Economy 2.37% 0%
Monetary Union 3.91% 1.90%
7Of course, the M matrix will diﬀer according to whether or not we are considering dis-
cretionary or commitment policy.
8The ﬁgures in Table 7 capture the expected costs of deviating from the eﬃcient level
of variables due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of ongoing shocks, expressed as a
percentage of steady-state consumption.
315.3 Implementation Lags
A frequently cited argument against employing ﬁscal instruments in a stabil-
isation role is that it often takes long periods to implement the tax changes
and government spending changes suggested by optimal policy. In this sub-
section we assess the extent to which implementation lags aﬀect the welfare
gains from ﬁscal stabilisation. We assume that it takes n-periods to change pol-
icy instruments following a change in the information set. This can be modelled
by conditioning policy instruments on information sets of n-periods ago, such
















the similar expression for price inﬂation,
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The equation describing the evolution of the ‘gapped’ real wage is unaﬀected.
This implies that it will take n-periods following the shock for the ﬁscal author-
i t i e st ob ea b l et oi m p l e m e n taﬁscal policy plan. In assessing the impact on
such implementation lags on welfare we consider four cases: (1) There are no
lags in adjusting ﬁscal instruments; (2) there is a one period lag in adjusting
tax in struments and 2 periods in adjusting government spending; (3) there is
a two period lag in adjusting tax instruments and a one year lag in adjust-
ing government spending; and (4) ﬁscal instruments are not changed over the
course of the business cycle. It is clear that implementation lags do reduce the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal instruments as stabilisation devices. However, there are
still non-trivial beneﬁts from ﬁscal stabilisation even under the ‘slow response’
scenario. In particular, expectations that instruments will change in the future
will impact on private sector decisions today in a forward looking model.










ρa =0 .6 1.1485 1.8770 2.0451 2.3121
ρa =0 .9 2.6735 3.5055 4.0023 5.3955
Of course these results are highly dependent upon the amount of inertia in
the economy. For example, increasing the degree of persistence in the technology
shock from 0.6 to 0.9 implies that there the impacts of shocks are felt for longer,
implying that even with implementation lags ﬁscal policy has a valuable role to
play in stabilising the economy.
9These are expressed as percentages of one period’s steady-state consumption.
326 Introducing Debt
In this subsection we consider the impact of introducing government debt to
our analysis of policy within a small open economy or within EMU10.U n t i l
now we have assumed that there was a lump-sum tax instrument which was
utilised to balance the budget whenever other ﬁscal instruments were used in a
stabilisation role. In this section we assume that any variations in government
spending or our sales or income tax instruments are not automatically adjusted
for in this way. Instead, any inconsistency between government tax revenues
and spending will aﬀect government debt. Policy must then ensure that any
relevant government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
I nt h ec a s eo fE M U ,A p p e n d i x7d e r i v e st he intertemporal budget constraint
for the union as a whole,
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where Bt is the aggregate level of the national debt stocks. With global market
clearing in asset markets the series of national budget constraints imply that
the only public-sector intertemporal budget constraint in our model is a union-
wide constraint. What is the intuition for this? Given complete capital markets
and our assumed initial conditions (zero net foreign assets and identical ex ante
structures in each economy) this means that initially consumers expect similar
ﬁscal policy regimes in their respective economies. To the extent that ex post
this is not the case, there will be state contingent payments under IRS that
ensure marginal utilities are equated throughout the union (after controlling
f o rr e a le x c h a n g er a t ed i ﬀerences)11. This would seem to suggest that ﬁscal
sustainability questions within this framework are a union-wide rather than a
national concern. Given that a national government’s contribution to union-
wide ﬁnances is negligible then this could be taken to imply that debt is not an
issue in utilising ﬁscal instruments at the national level.
However, given the ﬁscal institutions which have been constructed as part of
EMU, it seems unlikely that without such constraints each member state would
expect to operate under ex ante similar ﬁscal regimes. Therefore it may be
reasonable to assume that each member state operates a budget constraint of
this form at the national level, such that there is no need for the only institution
with a union-wide instrument, the ECB, to be concerned with issues of ﬁscal
solvency. Therefore we impose, as an external constraint created within the
10In Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005), we consider the signiﬁcance of adding debt to New
Keynesian models of monetary policy more fully.
11For the purposes of illustration, suppose taxes were lump-sum and one economy unexpect-
edly cut all taxes to zero. There would be transfers from this economy to the other economies
to ensure that the consumers in the other economies were not disadvantaged by the higher
taxes they had to pay to ensure union-wide solvency.
















We need to transform this budget constraint into a loglinearised ‘gap’ equa-
tion to allow it to be integrated into our policy problem. Additionally, in order to
support the assumption that the steady-state level of output was eﬃcient (which
was implicit in the welfare functions we developed) an obvious assumption to
make is that lump-sum taxation is used to ﬁnance the steady-state subsidy
(which oﬀsets, in steady-state, the distortions caused by distortionary taxation
and imperfect competition in wage and price setting). We shall then assume
that lump-sum taxation cannot be used to alter this subsidy or to ﬁnance any
other government activities, including the kind of spending and distortionary




T in all our economies at all points in time, allowing us to













i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service
government debt as well as stabilise the economy. This deﬁnes the basic trade-oﬀ
facing policy makers in utilising these instruments. This intertemporal budget








































This can be log-linearised as,
bi
t = Rbi
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34where bi



























































































Note, however, that gt in the model is deﬁned as, ln(1 − G
Y ). This implies, to a
ﬁrst order, that,
lnGi =l n (
Gi
Y i)+l n ( Y i) (195)
=l n ( 1 − exp(−gi)) + yi (196)
=
1 − γi,n
γi,n gi + yi (197)
where γi,n = Gi/Y i. In gap form this becomes,
lnGi,g =
1 − γi,n
γi,n gi,g + yi,g (198)




































This is our national government budget constraint, which must remain station-
ary as an additional constraint on policy makers.
6.1 Optimal Precommitment Policy with Government Debt
6.1.1 Open Economy Case
35The Lagrangian associated with the open economy case in the presence of a
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Here monetary policy must now take account of its impact on the government’s
ﬁnances.













and for real wages,
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which implies that, E0λ
b,i
t = λ
b,i ∀t . In other words policy must ensure that
the ‘cost’ of the government’s budget constraint is constant following a shock
which is the basis of the random walk result of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
This also implies that the lagrange multipliers for the wage and price phillips










































and the output gap,
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Combinations of these ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the national target criteria
for a variety of cases. In the open economy case the optimal combination of wage








This essentially describes the balance between wage and price adjustment in
achieving the new steady-state real wage consistent with the new steady-state
tax rates required to stabilise the debt stock following the shock. Taking the




b,i(−bτ(1 + ϕ)+( 1− β
−1)+by)=0 (210)
which deﬁnes the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the govern-
ment’s budget constraint which implies that the output gap is constant, but
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t)g)) + (brw + bτ − bτs)λ
b,i =0 (212)





t +( bτ − (1 − β
−1) − bg)λ
b,i =0 (213)
which is again constant given the lagrange multiplier λ
b,i .L e i t h a n d W r e n -
Lewis (2005) show that this lagrange multiplier, associated with the budget
constraint, can be solved as a function of the size of the initial debt stock and
the expected ﬁscal repercussions of any modelled shock. They also investigate
the nature of the time inconsistency problem inherent in adding debt to the
model, which is discussed in the simulation section below.
Taken together these target criteria imply that optimal policy ensures that
output and government spending adjust instantaneously to their new steady-
state levels, while gradual price and wage adjustment implies that it is optimal,
under commitment, to gradually reach the new steady-state tax rates consistent
with debt sustainability.
376.1.2 EMU Case
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In order to obtain intuition for optimal policy in this case it is helpful to
relate the (constant) value of the lagrange multiplier associated with the na-
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t =0 (214)
which also implies a constant relationship between the output and government
spending gaps following a shock.
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and a sales-tax rule,
0=2 ( 1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t +( by − ϕbτ +1− β
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which in conjunction with the tax rules, will achieve the constant relationship
between government spending and the output gap given above. Here we can
see that the presence of the national government budget constraint essentially
38introduces a constant wedge into the target criteria outlined above for the EMU
case without debt which reﬂects the needs to adjust ﬁscal instruments and
steady-state output and real wages to be consistent with the new steady-state
level of government debt which follows a random walk.









Assuming that the national ﬁscal authorities will follow these ﬁscal rules, this
will ensure that union-wide monetary policy achieves the following balance be-








with other union wide variables following paths consistent with the target cri-
teria outlined for the small open economy case above.
6.1.3 Simulations
In this section we consider using numerical simulation the ability of an small
open economy operating inside and outside of MU to stabilise the economy fol-
lowing a productivity shock through the use of ﬁscal instruments when it must
also ensure sustainability of the government’s ﬁnances. Figure 4 details the
paths of key endogenous variables following the same technology shock consid-
ered above when the economy is a member of monetary union. In the case of
commitment policy, the results are very similar to the case where there was a
lump-sum tax instrument balancing the national ﬁscal budget. The main diﬀer-
ence is that there is a gradual reduction in government debt in response to the
higher tax revenues generated by the positive productivity shock, until it reaches
its new lower steady-state with reduced sales and income taxes and higher gov-
ernment spending to satisfy the national ﬁscal constraint. This is essentially
a generalisation of the random walk result of Benigno and Woodford (2003)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), which also has echoes of tax smoothing
(Barro (1979)), but with additional inertia caused by the various sources of
inertia in the model. Essenitally, following the shock we have a random-walk
in the steady-state debt and tax levels. However, these diﬀerences have little
welfare implications with the costs of the shock rising from 1.150% to 1.154%.
A more substantial diﬀerence occurs when we consider the discretionary so-
lution. Under discretion the national ﬁscal authorities taking future inﬂationary
expectations as given, are tempted to use inﬂation rather than their ﬁscal in-
struments to stabilise national government debt. As a result, the larger initial
fall in inﬂation and the initial fall in income taxes serves to increase rather than
reduce debt initially. This temptation, which is a form of inﬂationary bias, re-
mains unless the debt stock returns close to its initial value (this is demonstrated
39formerly in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005)). Therefore, even although there is
no explicit debt target, optimal discretionary policy eliminates the eﬀects of
the productivity shock on the debt stock. In this particular case, the welfare
consequences of the shock are not dramatically aﬀected by the introduction of
government debt and welfare costs rise from 1.150% to 1.193% of one period’s
steady-state consumption.
We can also consider the same experiment in the case of a small open econ-
omy operating outside of monetary union. Without the need to utilise dis-
tortionary instruments to ensure ﬁscal solvency we have already seen that the
combination of monetary and ﬁscal instruments can perfectly oﬀset the impact
of technology shocks in a sticky wage/price economy. However, when the gov-
ernment must also ensure ﬁscal sustainability by varying distortionary ﬁscal
instruments this ﬁrst-best solution will no longer be attainable. Using our usual
technology shock we ﬁnd that the welfare costs of having to stabilise debt follow-
ing an autocorrelated technology shock amount to only 0.0012% of one-period’s
steady-state consumption under discretion, and an insigniﬁcant 1.23x10−4%u n -
der commitment.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have considered the potential role of various ﬁscal instruments in dealing
with a technology and two forms of cost-push shock in a microfounded open
economy model which contains both wage and price inertia. We looked at two
policy regimes: the case of ﬂexible exchange rates where monetary policy is op-
timal, and the case where the economy is a member of a ‘large’ monetary union.
The three ﬁscal instruments we consider are government spending, income taxes
and sales taxes.
I nt h ec a s eo fas m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y ,w h e na l lt h r e eﬁscal instruments are
freely available, then the impact of the technology shock can be completely
eliminated, whether policy acts with discretion or commitment. However, once
any one of these ﬁscal instruments is excluded as a stabilisation tool, costs
emerge. Using simulations, we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal instrument in this
case (in the sense of reducing the welfare costs of the shock) is either income
taxes or sales taxes. In contrast, having government spending as an instrument
contributes very little.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union does not respond)
are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely available, the
technology shock will incur welfare costs. Government spending is potentially
useful as a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for
monetary policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes in
reducing the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. If all three
instruments are freely available, then the costs of the shock can be reduced by
around a half, compared to the case where there is no ﬁscal stabilisation. We
also found that implementation lags could signiﬁcantly aﬀect (but not elimi-
40nate) the ability of ﬁscal instruments to deal with shocks, but that the need to
ensure ﬁscal solvency when utilising tax instruments in a stabilisation role had
negligible welfare consequences.
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41Appendix 1 - Wage Setting




































































(θwβ)s [ϕnt+s + ²wϕwt+s + ct+s + pt+s − ln(1 − τt+s)]
!
(222)



















Log-linearising this expression gives,
wt =( 1− θw)wt + θwwt−1 (225)
These two expressions can be solved for wage inﬂation to obtain the New Key-








here the forcing variable captures the extent to which the consumer’s labour
supply decision is not the same as it would be under ﬂexible prices.
42Appendix 2 - Price Setting


























































This can be loglinearised as,










where pH,t is the log of the optimal price set by those ﬁr m st h a tw e r ea b l et os e t






θpβEtpH,t+1 − at + wt − ln(1 − τs
t) −vt +l n ( µt) (231)











This can be log-linearised as,
pH,t =( 1− θp)pH,t + θppH,t−1 (233)























−at + wt − ln(1 − τs
t) − vt +l n ( µt)
T h i sc a nb es o l v e da s ,
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 +
(1 − θpβ)(1 − θp)
θp
(mct +l n ( µt)) (235)
where mct = −at+wt−pH,t−ln(1−τs
t)−vt are the real log-linearised marginal
costs of production. In the absence of sticky prices proﬁt maximising behaviour
implies, mc = −ln(µ).
43Appendix 3 - Derivation of Union and National
Welfare
The measure of welfare which we shall seek to approximate is based on an
aggregate of household utility,






The ﬁrst term can be expanded as
c = cn + cg (237)
= cn + α
Z 1
0
cg,jdj +( 1− α)(yg − gg) (238)
using (113). Before considering the second term we need to note the following


















represents terms that are of order higher than 3 in the bound
kakon the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places
in the derivation of welfare.















































































Taking logs and integrating over households,
Z 1
0




















=e x p [ ( 1 − ²w)b w(k)] (246)






















w h i c hi so fs e c o n do r d e r .
T h e r e f o r ew ec a nr e w r i t et h er e l a t i onship between the sum of household
labour inputs and the CES aggregate of these inputs as,
Z 1
0








From the deﬁnition of the variance it is also the case that,
Z 1
0




where vark{n(k)g} =( ²w)2vark{w(k)}.Using this expression and (248) the sec-



































45Now we need to relate the labour input gap to the output gap and a measure











It can be shown that (see GM(2004))




































The term in G can be expanded as
lnG =l n (
G
Y
)+yg + tip (255)




























Using these expansions, individual utility can be written as














































46so we can simplify this as































































utilising the fact that 1 − Gn
Y n =1− γn = 1
1+χ.





















































































Integrating over all economies, and utilising
Z
































W e l f a r ei st h es u mo fq u a d r a t i ct e r m si ni n ﬂation (for both wages and prices),
the output gap and the government spending gap in each country.
Derivation of national welfare for an economy outside of monetary union is
similar, but we need to take account of the diﬀerent subsidy needed to ensure
eﬃciency when the ineﬃciently high level of government spending outside of
monetary union is taken as given. In describing the monetary union wide welfare
function the subsidy was determined at the union level and implied that Ni =
(1 + χi)
1
1+ϕ and Gi =
χi
1+χiY i. This served to eliminate the levels terms when
constructing an aggregate European wide union. However, in the context of a
small open economy the subsidy implied,






1 − α + χ
(270)
Consider the second order approximation to term in G in utility,
lnG =l n (
G
Y
)+yg + tip (271)













where γn=Gn/Y n. We can then write, after solving (270)for χ
χlnGt =
γn(1 − α)
1 − γn lnGt (274)














Introducing this subsidy in the derivation of welfare above, after ignoring foreign
consumption, yields the following welfare function for country i,






































t )2 + (277)

















The variance in prices can then be replaced with the term in the rate of inﬂation
to yield national welfare,
Ψi = −

























We have thus eliminated the terms in the levels of the output gap and govern-
ment spending gap. However, implicitly we have two diﬀerent eﬃcient levels of
output since in the national economy outwith monetary union there is an ex-
ternality which it is assumed is unavoidable unless the country joins monetary
union.
49Appendix 4 - Precommitment Policy in the Small
Open Economy
Small Open Economy - All Fiscal Instruments
Let us consider the case where the ﬁscal authorities have access to govern-
ment spending and both tax instruments in order to stabilise their economy,
when operating alongside the national monetary authorities. Here the presence
of the national monetary policy implies, λ
y,i
t =0 ∀t so that the initial focs reduce








From these it is clear that if the authorities have access to the full set of ﬁscal
instruments, then the sales tax ensures λλ
π,i
t =0and the income tax foc implies,
e λwλ
πw,i






























Combining the focs for price and wage inﬂation yields the optimal combina-



















t − ln(1 − τi
t)g + uw
t =0 (288)
50and ensures that πi,t = πw
i,t =0



















The latter two conditions being achieved through a combination of monetary
policy and VAT changes. Here a combination of income tax and VAT changes
will achieve the real wage adjustment required to support the ﬂex price equi-
librium after monetary policy has eliminated the output gap. Wage and price
inﬂation will be zero, with income taxes achieving the required real wage ad-
justment.
Small Open Economy - VAT and Government
Spending
Now suppose we only have access to VAT and government spending as ﬁscal
instruments, our set of focs become, after imposing λλ
π,i
t =0from the foc from































t + e λwλ
πw,i
t =0 (295)
(5) the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t − e λw(1 + ϕ)λ
πw,i
t =0 (296)


















which delivers the optimal composition of GDP in the face of shocks.
From the foc for the output gap we know,
2y
i,g
t = e λwλ
πw,i
t (299)



























Here the loss of the income tax instrument when wages are sticky requires a
trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation stabilisation with inertia in policy which
is typical of precommitment solutions. Note that if we didn’t have the govern-
ment spending instrument, then we would simply drop the ﬁscal spending rule
from this target criterion.














(πi,t − βEtπi,t+1)=0 (303)






t + ²ln(1 − τ
i,s
t )g − ²u
p
t =0 (304)




























t + ²ln(1 − τ
i,s
t )g − ²u
p
t =0 (307)
Small Open Economy - Income Tax and Govern-
ment Spending
Now suppose we have the income tax instrument, but no Sales tax. The focs










































t − (1 + ϕ)λλ
π,i
t =0 (313)




















Using the wage inﬂation Phillips curve,
y
i,g










which is our ﬁrst target criterion.

























t − ln(1 − τi
t)g)=0 (318)










Small Open Economy - No Tax Instruments,
Only Government Spending
No tax instruments. Combining the focs for the government spending gap









From the foc for the output gap we have,
2y
i,g
t = e λwλ
πw,i
t (321)





























































































































This describes pre-commitment policy for all cases in the small open economy.
55Appendix 5 - Optimal Precommitment Under
EMU.
EMU - All Fiscal Instruments

























































which is slightly diﬀerent from the small open economy case. Using the focs for

























































(βEtπi,t+1 − πi,t)=0 (340)




t + ²(ln(1 − τ
i,s

























which eliminates wage inﬂation, and VAT tax rule,
(1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t + ²(ln(1 − τ
i,s





Without the national monetary policy instrument we can no-longer oﬀset all
shocks completely. Instead the income tax rule will eliminate wage inﬂation,
government spending will adjust to ensure the optimal composition of output
and the sales tax will be adjusted to achieve the best trade-oﬀ between output
and inﬂation given that competitiveness will need to be restored once any shock
has passed.
EMU Case - VAT and Government Spending
Now we start dropping ﬁscal instruments. Let’s suppose we don’t have the




i.e. the price Phillips curve ceases to be a constraint on maximising welfare
-VAT tax changes can oﬀset the impact on any other variables driving price










































and (5) the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g













t +2 ( 1+ϕ)y
i,g
t − e λwϕλ
πw,i
t =0 (351)












t − e λwλ
rw,i
t =0 (352)
































































Now consider foc for output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g








58and eliminate lagrange multipliers,
















































































































(βEtπi,t+1 − πi,t) (361)





t = ²(ln(1 − τ
i,s





This can either be interpreted as a government spending or sales tax rule. Now



































































59With only two instruments and four constraints, the precommitment pol-
icy implies a degree of both inertial and forward-looking behaviour typical of
analysis of monetary policy in the case of sticky wages and prices (see Woodford
(2003), Chapter 7 ).
EMUCase - Income Tax and Government Spend-
ing
Now suppose now income tax is the only tax instrument. The condition for






































































Using the wage inﬂation Phillips curve,
−λλ
π,i






t − ln(1 − τt)g + u
i,w
t )=0 (373)
























Substituting into the foc for the output gap,































t ) − (βEt ln(1 − τt+1)g − ln(1 − τt)g)
Using the deﬁnitions of the wage and price Phillips curves,






























t ) − (βEt ln(1 − τt+1)g − ln(1 − τt)g)
which is our dynamic income tax rule.
EMU Case - Government Spending the Only
Instrument

















































61and (5) the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g
















t − e λwϕλ
πw,i
t =0 (380)
























































































































Now turn to the foc for the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g








The can then be solved simultaneously to obtain the target criterion for govern-
ment spending. However this does not aﬀord any real intuition.
62Appendix 6 - Adding Government Debt
Until now we have ﬁnanced any deﬁcit between government spending and
distortionary tax revenues with a lump-sum tax. It is, however, interesting
to discover how relaxing the assumption that lump-sum taxation balances the
budget aﬀects the use of ﬁscal policy as a stabilisation device.
Recall the home country consumer’s budget constraint,
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1D(k)t+1} ≤ Πt + D(k)t + W(k)tN(k)t(1 − τt) − Tt (386)
D(k)t+1 is a random variable, whose value depends on the state of the world in
period t+1i.e. it is the household’s planned state-contingent wealth. Note that
there is no household index on the household’s consumption. This is because the
complete set of asset markets implies all households face the same intertemporal
budget constraint and will choose the same consumption plan (this is discussed
more fully below). We can aggregate these constraints across households, to
obtain the private sector’s budget constraint in the home economy,
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Πt + Dt + WtNt(1 − τt) − Tt (387)
There is a unique stochastic discount factor which has the property,
At = Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1] (388)
where At is the end-of period nominal value of the household’s portfolio of
assets. If the household chooses to hold only risk-less one period bonds then
this condition becomes,
Dt+1 = RtAt
However, households will not only hold government bonds as they will wish to
hold a complete set of contingent assets (given the stickiness in wage and price





Et+1[Qt+1,T(ΠT + W(k)TN(k)T(1 − τT) − TT] (389)
with certainty, no matter what state of the world emerges. These series of bor-
rowing constraints and ﬂow budget constraints then deﬁnes the intertemporal
budget constraint. It is normal to rule out no-Ponzi schemes which amount to,
∞ X
T=t
Et[Qt,T(ΠT + W(k)TN(k)T(1 − τT) − TT] < ∞ (390)
at each point in time across all possible states of the world. These can be
combined to yield the intertemporal budget constraint (see Woodford, 2003,
Chapter 2, page 69),
∞ X
T=t
Et[PTCT] ≤ Dt +
∞ X
T=t
Et[Qt,T(ΠT + W(k)TN(k)T(1 − τT) − TT)] (391)
63Note what this implies. For all households to be consuming the same they
must have diﬀerent initial holdings of wealth to compensate for diﬀerences in
expected incomes caused by stickiness in wage setting. Optimisation on the part
of households then implies that these constraints hold as equalities (otherwise
they are missing out on consumption opportunities by not fully exploiting their
intertemporal budget constraints). Aggregating over households would, in a
closed economy, allow us to show the equivalence of private and public sector
budget constraints.
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PHY = WN+ Π − κWN+ τsPHYH (392)




Et[Qt,T(PH,TYT − PTCT − WTNT(τT − κ) − τs
TPH,TYH,T − TT)]
(393)
Recall the goods market clearing condition in the home economy,









)di + G (394)
Similar conditions exist in economy j,









)di + Gj (395)
This can then be aggregated across member states,
Z 1
0











































with the nominal exchange rate ﬁxed at its normalised value of 1 in monetary
union we get the expression in the main text.
64Appendix 7 - Optimal Commitment Policy with
Government Debt
Open Economy Case
The Lagrangian associated with the open economy case in the presence of a




































t (πi,t − βEt{πi,t+1} − λ[rw
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t−1 − πi,t) − bgg
i,g
































Here monetary policy must now take account of its impact on the government’s
ﬁnances.













and for real wages,
−λλ
π,i















which implies that, E0λ
b,i
t = λ
b,i ∀t . In other words policy must ensure that
the ‘cost’ of the government’s budget constraint is constant following a shock
which is the basis of the random walk result of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
65This also implies that the lagrange multipliers for the wage and price Phillips









































and the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g


















gives us the optimal combination of wage and price inﬂation. This essentially
describes the balance between wage and price adjustment in achieving the new
steady-state real wage consistent with the new steady-state tax rates required





b,i(−bτ(1 + ϕ)+( 1− β
−1)+by)=0 (408)
which deﬁnes the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the govern-
ment’s budget constraint which implies that the output gap is constant. Using












i,t+1)+( brw + bτ − bτs)λ
b,i
t =0 (410)
Using the NKPCs for price and wage inﬂation these can be rewritten as the
sales and income tax rules, respectively,
−2²(rw
i,g
t − ln(1 − τ
i,s
t )g + u
p


















t +( bτ − (1 − β
−1) − bg)λ
b,i =0 (413)
which is again constant.
EMU Case:
The Lagrangian associated with the open economy case in the presence of a
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Here monetary policy must now take account of its impact on the union’s ﬁ-
nances.













and for real wages,
−λλ
π,i
















67which implies that, E0λ
b,i
t = λ
b,i ∀t . In other words policy must ensure that
the ‘cost’ of the government’s budget constraint is constant following a shock
which is the basis of the random walk result of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
This also implies that the lagrange multipliers for the wage and price phillips









































and the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g


















t +( by − ϕbτ − bg)λ
b,i
t =0 (423)
g i v e su sad e ﬁnition of the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget con-
straint, which also implies a constant relationship between the output and gov-
ernment spending gaps following a shock.





i,t+1)+( brw + bτ − bτv)λ
b,i
t =0 (424)























Use in the output gap equation and using the NKPCs to eliminate the inﬂation
dynamics gives us a sales-tax rule,
0=2 ( 1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t +( by − ϕbτ +1− β








68Need to get a government spending rule. Foc for output gap gives,
0=2 ( 1 + ϕ)y
i,g
t + λ






































t − 2(1 + ϕ)
(bτ − bg − 1+β
−1)









(bτ − bg − 1+β
−1)
(−bτ(1 + ϕ)+( 1− β
−1)+by)





(bτ − bg − 1+β
−1)





Using the NKPCs for price and wage inﬂation to eliminate the inﬂation dynamics
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t − ln(1 − τ
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−1)








t − ln(1 − τi
t)g + uw
t )
69Appendix 8 - Variable Deﬁnitions
A− Productivity
C− Aggregate consumption bundle
C∗− Aggregate foreign consumption.
CF− Aggregate of goods produced abroad.
CH− Bundle of domestically produced consumption goods.
CH(j)− Good j within bundle of domestically produced consumption goods.
Ci− Bundle of goods produced in country i.
D− Nominal payoﬀ from ﬁnancial assets (including share of proﬁts in ﬁrms)
εi− Bilateral nominal exchange rate with country i.
ε− Eﬀective nominal exchange rate.
G(j)− public good j.
G− Aggregate provision of public goods.
N(j)− domestic labour employed by ﬁrm j.
N(k)− Labour supplied by household k.
N− Aggregate domestic labour input.
P− Aggregate consumer price index associated with C
PH - Domestic price index associated with CH
πH− Rate of inﬂation in PH
PH(j)− Price of good CH(j)
Pi− Index of domestic prices in country i (in home country currency).
Pi
i− Index of domestic prices in country i in country i’s currency.
Pi
i(j)−Price of country i’s good j expressed in terms of country i’s currency.
P∗− World price level (both consumer and output prices)
Qt,t+1− Stochastic discount factor measuring current certainty equivalent value
of an uncertain future payoﬀ.
Qi−B i l a t e r a lr e a le x c h a n g er a t e .
Q − Eﬀective real exchange rate.
70Si− Bilateral terms of trade with country i.
S− eﬀective terms of trade.
τ− Income tax rate
τs− Sales tax rate.
v− logged value of employment subsidy (1 − χ)
W(k)− Nominal wage charged by household k.
W− Wage index for home country.
πw− Rate of inﬂation in W.
In the paper, lower case letters denote logged values of the associated levels
variable, n superscripts denote ‘natural’ values that would occur in the absence
of nominal inertia and ‘g’ denotes ‘gap’ variables - the diﬀerence between the
logged variable and its logged natural value.
71Appendix 9 - Parameter Deﬁnitions
1 −α - weight on domestically produced goods in consumption - a measure of
home bias.
β− Consumers subjective discount factor.
²− elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods (= price
elasticity of demand for domestically produced goods.
²w− elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labour (= wage elasticity
of demand for domestically labour types.
η− elasticity of substitution between bundles of goods produced in foreign
economies (see equal to 1 for simplicity).
χ− weight on public goods in utility.
ϕ−labour supply parameter.
1 − θp− probability of price adjustment in each period.
1 − θw− probability of wage adjustment in each period.
µ− steady-state mark-up in domestic goods market.
µw− steady-state mark-up in domestic labour market.
72Appendix 10 - Matrix Representation of Model
The small open economy model can be represented in matrix form as,
A0xt+1 = A1xt + B0ut + εt
where xt is a vector of endogenous variables, ut are a vector of policy instruments
and εt av e c t o ro fs h o c k s ,a l lo fw h i c ha r ed e ﬁned as follows,
xt =
⎡









































⎦ and εt =
⎡


















⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −11 00 1 0 1 0 0
00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00 λ 00 0 0 0 β 0
00−e λw −e λw 00( 1 + ϕ)e λw 00β
⎤


































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
This can then be solved to obtain the form used in Soderlind (1999),
xt+1 = Axt + But + εt
where A =( A0)−1A1 and B =( A0)−1B0.T h e ﬁrst eight variables in xt
are considered to be predetermined, while the last two are jump variables. The










t − πi,t − ∆ai
t
which implies that the system must exhibit the property of price level control.
This is obtained from
yt = c∗
t + gt + st (432)
and the deﬁnition of the terms of trade,
st = pF,t − pH,t (433)
= et + p∗
t − pH,t (434)
after imposing the ﬁxed exchange rate and assuming the shock hits country
i only. (Productivity enters by considering the change in the natural level of
output).
The open economy case has the same representation, but the output gap
can be considered a control variable from the point of view of the monetary












































⎦ and εt =
⎡


















⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −11 00 1 0 1 0 0
00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00 λ 00 0 0 0 β 0
00−e λw ϕe λw 00( 1 + ϕ)e λw 00β
⎤


































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
The remaining variants considered in the paper can then be calculated by elim-
inating the controls no longer in use.
Adding in debt the EMU model becomes,
xt =
⎡

















































































γn 00 ( R − 1) 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00−11 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00 0 λ 00 0 0 0 β 0
00 0 −e λw ϕe λw 00( 1 + ϕ)e λw 00β
⎤




⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
R 00000 0 00−R 0
000000 0 00 0 0
000000 0 00 0 1
000100 1 00 0 0
000000 0 00 0 0
000000 0 00 0 0
000001ρa 0 000
000000 1 10 0 0
000000 0 00 1 0
000000 0 00 1 0
000000 0 00 0 1
⎤





















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
while similar adjustments are made when introducing debt in the case of a small
open economy operating under ﬂexible exchange rates.
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Figure 1: Response to a 1% technology shock in an open economy with only


























Figure 4: Response to 1% technology shock under EMU with all ﬁscal instru-
ments and government debt.
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